This litigation tracker compiles key cases addressing payday loan app products. It highlights how courts and enforcement authorities are analyzing core issues such as whether advances constitute “credit,” how fees and tips are treated under applicable law, and whether these products trigger protections like the Military Lending Act’s 36% rate cap and other disclosure and anti-evasion requirements.

So far, every court that has analyzed payday loan app products has concluded that they are credit.

Vickery v. Empower Finance (3:25-cv-03675; 25-6377)
JurisdictionN.D. California (San Francisco) & 9th Circuit
SummaryVickery v. Empower Finance is a putative class action alleging that Empower’s “Cash Advance” earned wage access product violates the Military Lending Act, Truth in Lending Act, and Georgia Payday Lending Act. The district court held that the Cash Advance qualifies as “credit” under the Military Lending Act, making Empower a “creditor” and rendering its arbitration clause unenforceable for covered servicemembers. On that basis, the court denied Empower’s motion to compel arbitration. Empower has appealed the ruling to the Ninth Circuit and parties are briefing the appeal.
Alleged ViolationsMilitary Lending Act, Truth in Lending Act, Georgia Payday Lending Act (GA)
StatusMTC denied; Appealed 9th Circuit
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Moss v. Cleo AI Inc. (2:25-cv-00879; 25-5856)
JurisdictionW.D. Washington & 9th Circuit
SummaryMoss v. Cleo AI, Inc. is a puntative class action alleging that Cleo’s “Cash Advance” app conceals its true cost. Cleo's Cash Advance fees translate into triple-digit APRs, trapping active-duty servicemembers in cycles of debt. The court denied Cleo’s motion to dismiss, finding that the complaint plausibly alleges that Cleo’s express-fee and subscription-fee structure functions as “finance charges” under Military Lending Act and Truth in Lending Act. Cleo appealed to the Ninth Circuit and the parties have submitted briefing.
Alleged ViolationsMilitary Lending Act, Truth in Lending Act
StatusMotion to Dismiss Denied; Appealed 9th Circuit; stayed
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Golubiewski v. Activehours, Inc. (3:22-cv-02078)
JurisdictionM.D. Pennsylvania
SummaryGolubiewski v. Activehours, Inc. is a putative class action alleging that EarnIn disguises usurious interest as “tips” and “lightning speed” fees on its cash-advance app and is not licensed under Pennsylvania lending laws. The court denied EarnIn’s motion to dismiss claims under the Pennsylvania Loan Interest and Protection Law, the Consumer Discount Company Act, and Truth in Lending Act, finding the fees plausibly constitute finance charges. The case is now in the discovery phrase.
Alleged ViolationsUnfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (PA), Loan Interest and Protection Law (PA), Consumer Discount Company Act (PA), Truth in Lending Act
StatusMotion to Dismiss Denied; Discovery
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Johnson v. Activehours, Inc. (1:24-cv-02283)
JurisdictionD. Maryland
SummaryJohnson v. Activehours, Inc., is a proposed class action alleging that EarnIn’s cash-advance app charges “lightning speed” fees and optional “tips” that effectively serve as interest. The court granted in part and denied in part EarnIn’s motion to dismiss, finding the plaintiffs plausibly allege that EarnIn functions as a creditor under Maryland’s Credit Law and that its fees may violate the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint in October 2025, to which EarnIn again moved to dismiss. The court has not acted on the motion to dismiss, and the case remains ongoing with discovery.
Alleged ViolationsConsumer Loan Law (MD), Consumer Protection Act (MD), Truth in Lending Act
StatusMotion to Dismiss Amended Complaint granted (MCLL, interest in excess; Truth in Lending Act, creditor and advances credit) and denied in part (MCPA, reliance); Discovery
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Orubo v. Activehours, Inc. (5:24-cv-04702)
JurisdictionN.D. California (San Jose)
SummaryOrubo v. Activehours, Inc., is a putative class action alleging that EarnIn disguises usurious “lightning speed” fees and required “tips” as non-loan service charges. Plaintiffs claim those fees produce APRs ranging from 130% to over 1,700% and that EarnIn fails to disclose the true cost of its “advance” to users. The court denied EarnIn’s motion to dismiss. EarnIn filed a motion for judgment on pleadings alleging the tips and lighting speed fees are voluntary and therefore not finance charges under Truth in Lending Act, "Cash Out" product is neither "credit" nor a "loan" under Truth in Lending Act and Georgia law, and Georgia law confirms tips and fees are not "interest." In November 2025, the court announced it will issue further order on EarnIn's motion. The case is in the discovery phase with protective order.
Alleged ViolationsGeorgia Payday Loan Act (GA), Truth in Lending Act
StatusMotion to Dismiss Denied; Motion for Judgment on Pleadings pending; Discovery
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Stow v. Activehours, Inc. (1:25-cv-00391)
JurisdictionM.D. North Carolina
SummaryStow et al. v. Activehours, Inc. is a class action alleging that EarnIn’s cash-advance app’s “lightning speed” fees and required “tips” violate North Carolina consumer-finance statutes. EarnIn moved to compel arbitration based on its online Terms of Service signed by named plaintiffs. The court granted the motion, finding the plaintiffs had validly agreed to arbitration, and stayed the case for one year.
Alleged ViolationsNorth Carolina Consumer Finance Act (NC), North Carolina Debt Collection Act (NC), North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act (NC)
StatusMotion to Dismiss Granted; Stayed (moving to arbitration)
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Revell v. Grant Money, LLC (3:25-cv-05994; 25-7035)
JurisdictionN.D. California & 9th Circuit
SummaryRevell v. Grant Money, LCC is a putative class action alleging that Grant Money's earned wage access product violates the Military Lending Act, Truth in Lending Act, and Georgia Payday Lending Act. The court denied the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and refused to strike the class claims, finding the arbitration agreement unenforceable under the Military Lending Act because the EWA constitutes “consumer credit.” Grant Money has appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
Alleged ViolationsMilitary Lending Act, Truth in Lending Act, Georgia Payday Loan Act
StatusMotion to Dismiss Denied; Appealed 9th Circuit
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Ramirez v. ActiveHours, Inc. (5:25-cv-03625)
JurisdictionN.D. California (San Jose)
SummaryRamirez v. ActiveHours, Inc is a punitive class action challenging EarnIn's "CashOut" and "Lightning Speed" advances violating the Military Lending Act, Truth in Lending Act, and Illinois Predatory Loan Prevention Act. Parties have stipulated to select arbitration, and the case was referred on August 21, 2025. Simultaneously, the parties have completed briefing on EarnIn's motion to dismiss with a hearing scheduled on November 20, 2025. An order on the motion to dismiss is forthcoming.
Alleged ViolationsMilitary Lending Act, Truth in Lending Act, Illinois Predatory Loan Prevention Act and Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (IL)
StatusMotion to Dismiss denied
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District of Columbia v. Activehours, Inc. (2024-CAB-007303)
JurisdictionSuperior Court District of Columbia
SummaryIn District of Columbia v. Activehours, Inc., the D.C. Attorney General sued EarnIn alleging that its “Cash Out” earned wage access product is deceptively marketed as fee-free and interest-free when in fact it charges “Lightning Speed” fees, asserts that these fees translate into average APRs over 300%, far exceeding the District’s 24% interest rate cap, and claims EarnIn has operated in D.C. without the required lending license. The court granted EarnIn's motion to dismiss finding it did not have primary jurisdiction over whether Cash Out is a loan deferring to the D.C. Department of Insurance, Securities, and Banking on the matter and allowed other key claims related to EarnIn's deceptive practices to move forward. The D.C. Attorney General filed a motion for reconsideration and interlocatory appeal. The court denied reconsideration based on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and granted the interlocutory appeal. The case is now in discovery.
Alleged ViolationsUnfair & Deceptive Trade Practices, Consumer Protection Procedures Act (DC), Title 16 (Lending License), Consumer Protection Procedures Act (DC), Code § 28-3301(a) (interest rate cap), Consumer Protection Procedures Act (DC)
StatusMotion to Dismiss Granted in Part, Denied in Part; Motion for Reconsideration Denied and Interlocutory Appeal Granted; Discovery
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People of the State of New York v. DailyPay (154851/2025)
JurisdictionN.Y. Supreme Court
SummaryIn People of the State of New York v. DailyPay, Inc., the New York Attorney General sued DailyPay alleging that its on‑demand pay product operates as an illegal, high‑cost payday lender violating New York usury and wage assignment laws by automatically deducting repayment (plus fees) from user's next paychecks. DailyPay filed a declaratory judgment asking the court to find its product is not a loan and there is no true debt obligation. In September 2025, the case was remanded to N.Y. Supreme Court. On January 23, 2026, DailyPay filed a motion to dismiss, which is currently being briefed.
Alleged ViolationsWage Assignment (NY), Civil Usury (NY), Criminal Usury (NY), False Advertising (NY), Fraud (NY), Deceptive Practices, Consumer Financial Protection Act, Deceptive Acts or Practices, Consumer Financial Protection Act, Abusive Acts or Practices, Consumer Financial Protection Act
StatusRemanded to N.Y. Supreme Court; Motion to Dismiss Filed.
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People of the State of New York v. MoneyLion (451303/2025)
JurisdictionN.Y. Supreme Court
SummaryIn People of the State of New York v. MoneyLion, the New York Attorney General sued MoneyLion alleging that its “Instacash” advances are effectively high‑cost payday loans disguised as fee‑free wage advances charging mandatory fees (up to $8.99 on a $100, two‑week advance) and soliciting tips, resulting in APRs well above legal limits. In September 2025, the case was remanded to N.Y. Supreme Court. On January 23, 2026, MoneyLion filed a motion to dismiss.
Alleged ViolationsCivil Usury (NY), Criminal Usury (NY), Fraud (NY), GBL § 349 (NY), GBL § 350 (NY), Deceptive Acts or Practices, Consumer Financial Protection Act, Abusive Acts or Practices, Consumer Financial Protection Act
StatusRemanded to N.Y. Supreme Court; Motion to Dismiss Filed.
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Mayor and City of Baltimore v. MoneyLion (1:25-cv-03692)
JurisdictionDistrict Court of Maryland
SummaryIn Mayor and City of Baltimore v. Moneylion, the City of Baltimore sued MoneyLion alleging that its “Instacash Advances” amount to usurious, high‑cost loans disguised as fee‑free earned wage advances. The City argues that MoneyLion inflates its revenue through “tips” and fees that translate into APRs well above Maryland’s 33% legal cap, in violation of the city’s Consumer Protection Ordinance. MoneyLion removed the case to federal court (District of Maryland) and has requested an extension to respond to the City's complaint. The City of Baltimore filed a motion to remand back to state court, which has been briefed by the parties.
Alleged ViolationsDeceptive Trade Practices (Baltimore City Code), Unfair Trade Practices (MCPA, Truth in Lending Act)
StatusWaiting response to Complaint Motion to Remand
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Michael Russell et al. v. Dave Inc. and Evolve Bank & Trust (2:25-cv-04029; 26-12)
JurisdictionDistrict Court, C.D. California & 9th Circuit
SummaryIn Russell et al. v. Dave, plaintiffs sued Dave and Evolve Bank & Trust alleging that its "ExtraCash" product engages in predatory lending practices that violate the Military Lending Act, the Truth in Lending Act, and Georgia Payday Loan Act. Plaintiffs allege that when the various finance charges are considered, the average APR for an ExtraCash loan is 329%. The Court held ExtraCash offers credit and that its fees are finance charges within the meaning of Truth in Lending Act and Military Lending Act, notwithstanding the fact that it is styled as an overdraft. The Court found that the Regulation Z exemptions for overdraft fees do not apply because there was a written agreement for credit. The court also noted that in applying Truth in Lending Act is looks to substance over for, and ExtraCash bears more similarly to typical credit arrangments, than accommodation for inadvertent overdrafts. Dave appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
Alleged ViolationsMilitary Lending Act, Truth in Lending Act, Georgia Payday Loan Act
StatusMotion to Dismiss denied; Appealed to 9th Cirucit
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Feeman, et al. v. Albert Corporation, et al (2:25-cv-03605)
JurisdictionC.D. California
SummaryFeeman v. Albert Corp. is a putative class action alleging that Albert Corporation and Albert Cash, LLC’s “Albert Instant” violates the Military Lending Act, Truth in Lending Act, and the Georgia Payday Lending Act. Albert Instant extends high-cost consumer credit (exceeding 400% military APR) to active-duty servicemembers and their families, requiring a six-day repayment period, without complying with federal disclosure requirements or the Military Lending Act’s 36% APR cap. The parties reached a class-wide settlement. The district court granted preliminary approval of the settlement, vacated the motion to compel arbitration, and stayed the case pending final approval. Under the proposed settlement, Albert agreed to create a $5.2 million settlement fund to provide pro rata monetary relief to class members, estimated at approximately $30 per eligible transaction, and to implement injunctive relief prohibiting the assessment of certain transfer fees on advances to servicemembers and their dependents for a defined period. Albert denied all wrongdoing but agreed to settle to avoid the costs and risks of continued litigation. The settlement is pending final approval.
Alleged ViolationsMilitary Lending Act, Truth in Lending Act
StatusThe settlement is pending final approval.
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Mayor and City of Baltimore v. Dave, Inc. (1:26-cv-00369)
JurisdictionD.C. Maryland
SummaryIn Mayor and City of Baltimore v. Moneylion, the City of Baltimore sued Dave, Inc alleging that its “ExtraCash Advances” amount to usurious, high‑cost loans disguised as fee‑free earned wage advances. The City argues that Dave inflates its revenue through “tips” and fees that translate into APRs well above Maryland’s 33% legal cap, in violation of the city’s Consumer Protection Ordinance. Dave removed the case to federal court (District of Maryland) and has requested an extension to respond to the City's complaint. The City requested that the case be heard in circuit court for Baltimore City.
Alleged ViolationsDeceptive Trade Practices (Baltimore City Code), Unfair Trade Practices (MCPA, Truth in Lending Act)
StatusBriefing City's remand motion.
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Moss v. Klover Holdings, Inc. (25-cv-5758)
JurisdictionN.D. Ilinois
SummaryMoss v. Klover Holdings, Inc. is a putative national class action alleging that Klover’s “Klover advance” and “Balance Advance” violate the Truth in Lending Act and the Military Lending Act. Klover markets its advances as cash advances that provide users with funds before payday in exchange for users’ authorization to debit their linked bank accounts on a scheduled date, and that Klover’s expedite fees and “tips” are finance charges that result in effective interest rates that exceed the Military Lending Act’s 36% APR limitation on credit extended to servicemembers and their dependents. Klover moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that its “non‑recourse” advance products do not constitute credit under the Truth in Lending Act or the Military Lending Act and that its fees are not finance charges. The court denied the motion, holding that the factual allegations plausibly allege that Klover’s products constitute extensions of consumer credit under the Truth in Lending Act and the Military Lending Act and that Klover’s expedite fees and tips are finance charges incident to the extension of credit. The court also adopted the reasoning of other federal district courts, finding that similar earned wage access and cash advance products meet the statutory definitions of credit and finance charge under Truth in Lending Act and the Military Lending Act.
Alleged ViolationsMilitary Lending Act, Truth in Lending Act
StatusMotion to Dismiss denied.
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Lowe v. MoneyLion (1:25-cv-04098; 26-655)
JurisdictionS.D. New York; 2nd Circuit
SummaryLowe v. MoneyLion Technologies Inc. is a putative class action alleging that MoneyLion’s "Instacash" violates the Military Lending Act and Truth in Lending Act. MoneyLion requires borrowers, including active-duty servicemembers, to link bank accounts and authorizes automatic debits on payday, and its subscription and expedite fees constitute finance charges under Military Lending Act and Truth in Lending Act. The complaint further contends that MoneyLion’s business model functions as high-cost credit without proper disclosures, misrepresenting the cost of funds and eligibility terms to borrowers. MoneyLion moved to dismiss the amended complaint or compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. The court denied MoneyLion’s motions, holding that it joins many others across the nation in concluding that "these early payday services constitute the extension of credit." The court emphasized that MoneyLion's "no obligation to repay" is limited because 98% of customers repay advances, and MoneyLion's Turbo Fees and Tips are part and parcel of the overwhelming majority of Instacash advances, and waiting for five days for payment defeats the purpose of early wage access. MoneyLion has appealed the court's decision to the Second Circuit.
Alleged ViolationsMilitary Lending Act, Truth in Lending Act
StatusMotion to Dismiss denied; Appealed to 2nd Circuit
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Burrison v. FloatMe (1:25-CV-10885; 26-1256)
JurisdictionD. Massachusetts; 1st Circuit
SummaryBurrison v. FloatMe, Corp. is a putative class action alleging that FloatMe’s cash advance product violates the Military Lending Act and the Truth in Lending Act.FloatMe makesadvances to users, including active duty servicemembers, requiring linked bank accounts and automated debits on payday, and that its subscription and expedite fees constitute finance charges under Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 1026.4(a). The district court considered whether the Military Lending Act applied, noting that under 10 U.S.C. § 987, “consumer credit” excludes only residential mortgages or loans tied to the purchase of personal property, and otherwise is defined by a combination of statutory and regulatory definitions. To qualify as consumer credit under the Military Lending Act, the extension of credit must involve: (1) credit (the right to defer or incur debt), (2) a covered borrower, for personal, family, or household purposes, and (3) a “creditor” engaged in the business of extending consumer credit to covered borrowers more than 25 times per year. The court observed that FloatMe’s cash advance model, automatic debits, ongoing underwriting, and fees for instant access, falls within this definition. FloatMe moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, but the court held that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable under the Military Lending Act, which bars enforcement in disputes involving consumer credit extended to servicemembers. The court further held that this limitation extends to Burrison’s Truth in Lending Act claim, finding it likewise non-arbitrable. FloatMe has appealed the district court’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Alleged ViolationsMilitary Lending Act, Truth in Lending Act
StatusMotion to Dismiss denied; Appealed to 1st Circuit
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Giordano Handy-Gerena v. Activehours, Inc., d/b/a EarnIn (2025-CAB-002545)
JurisdictionSuperior Court District of Columbia
SummaryGiordano Handy-Gerena v. EarnIn is a puntative class action alleging that EarnIn's Instant Cash violates D.C.'s consumer protection laws by operating as an unlicensed lender, misrepresenting its cash advances as non-loan products, and charging unlawful, high-cost credit through EarnIn's lighting speed fees and so-called tips. These fees function as interest, pushing the effective cost of borrowing above D.C.’s legal limits while obscuring the true price of the transactions. EarnIn moved to dismiss, arguing that it is not a lender, that its fees are not interest, and that its product falls outside existing lending and check-cashing laws. It also invoked the “primary jurisdiction” doctrine, contending that the Department of Insurance, Securities and Banking (DISB), not courts, should decide whether its business model requires a license. The court granted EarnIn's motion to dismiss on the basis of primary jurisdiction. Applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the court emphasized the DISB's authority over financial institutions, the need for regulatory discretion in addressing financial products, and the risk of inconsistent rulings while regulators are actively considering how to treat earned wage access. Because DISB has not yet issued definitive rules and is currently evaluating the issue, the court determined that these questions should first be addressed by DISB.
Alleged ViolationsD.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act
StatusMotion to Dismiss granted
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