The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) and National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) filed an amicus brief supporting Oregon’s authority to enforce its interest-rate protections against loans made to Oregon residents by out-of-state, state-chartered banks.
The case, National Association of Industrial Bankers, et al. v. O’Day, concerns House Bill 4116, legislation that overrides the federal interest-rate preemption provisions of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA). When a state, like Oregon, “opts out” of DIDMCA, it restores its authority to apply its usury statutes to loans made to residents by out-of-state lenders. The plaintiffs, a group of bank and lending industry associations, are challenging the law and seeking to prevent Oregon from enforcing it.
At issue is Section 525 of DIDMCA, which expressly allows states to opt out of federal preemption of state usury laws. CRL and NCLC’s brief explains why Section 525 preserves Oregon’s authority to enforce its interest-rate protections against loans made to Oregon residents, regardless of where the bank is located.
Oregon’s experience demonstrates why that state authority matters. Oregon has maintained a 36% APR cap on consumer finance loans since 2007. Yet the Oregon Division of Financial Regulation reported that more than 31,000 consumer finance loans totaling at least $61 million had been made to Oregon borrowers at rates exceeding the state’s cap since 2020. The agency attributed those loans to rent-a-bank schemes relying on DIDMCA’s rate-exportation provisions. The brief also highlights a 2026 enforcement action involving Wheels Financial Group, which made loans to Oregon consumers through a Utah-chartered bank at rates exceeding Oregon’s 36% APR cap. Oregon regulators found that Wheels collected about $1.4 million in interest above Oregon’s statutory limits and ordered the company to refund $900,000 to Oregon borrowers.
CRL and NCLC urge the court to uphold Oregon’s authority to enforce its interest-rate protections and deny the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.